Why there is no single number to compare across these fields
A useful comparison would need the same kind of measurement in each field: the same definition of fatigue, the same kind of uncertain decision, and the same way of counting errors. The studies available do not do this. One models how fatigue raises the probability of human error and weakens an operator's response in a maritime offloading operation, and it explicitly stays within that setting rather than comparing sectors [1]. The aviation papers discuss human error, fatigue, and legal consequences, but they do not report error rates that could be lined up against finance or court decisions [2][3][4].
This matters because a rate is only meaningful next to its denominator. An error probability per hour of a prolonged maritime operation is not the same quantity as a share of accidents attributed to human error, and neither is the same as a judge's or a banker's decision under uncertainty. Treating these as interchangeable would manufacture a comparison the evidence does not support.
What fatigue appears to do when decisions are uncertain
The clearest mechanism comes from the maritime risk model. There, fatigue is treated as affecting memory and attention, which raises the probability of human error at the start of an accident pathway, and it also reduces the availability of the operator's response when something goes wrong [1]. In plain terms, tiredness makes the first mistake more likely and makes catching it less likely. Over a 20-hour operation, applying this fatigue progression to both parts of the pathway raised the modelled cumulative collision probability from about 9 in a million to about 12 in a million, and the near-miss probability from about 29 in a million to about 43 in a million [1].
Those numbers are small and come from a model built on specified assumptions, so they should be read as an illustration of direction and scale within that scenario, not as a universal fatigue penalty. The same study notes that its predicted risk trajectories depend on the transition probabilities and state probabilities it was given [1]. The takeaway is qualitative: fatigue compounds risk by degrading both the decision and the recovery from it.
Aviation shows the stakes; the courts appear as responders, not as measured decision-makers
In aviation, human error is described as accounting for roughly 80% of accidents, and mental fatigue is listed among the preconditions for unsafe acts [2][3]. That is a statement about the share of accidents linked to human error, not a measured fatigue-specific error rate during uncertain decisions, and it should not be read as one. The aviation literature also ties these events to legal consequences, including criminalization and liability questions that create uncertainty for aviation professionals [2][4].
The judiciary enters these papers mainly as an institution that investigates, judges, or is affected by aviation accidents, not as a group whose fatigue-related error rates were measured [2][3]. One paper notes that the judiciary's role in aviation has changed since a landmark inquiry, and another discusses variation and uncertainty across countries in how air disasters are treated legally [3][4]. These are useful for understanding the legal aftermath of error, but they do not supply a court-domain error rate to compare with aviation.
Finance is missing, and what a real comparison would require
None of the available studies measures fatigue-related error rates in finance. The finance sector is part of the question but not part of the evidence, so any claim that bankers, traders, pilots, and judges show comparable or different fatigue effects would be unsupported. The maritime model is the only one here that quantifies how fatigue changes error and response probabilities over time, and it is confined to its own operational setting [1].
A genuine cross-domain answer would need parallel measurements: a shared definition of fatigue, decisions of comparable uncertainty, and error counts with clear denominators in each field. Until then, the defensible conclusion is that fatigue plausibly raises error and weakens recovery in uncertain, safety-critical work, as modelled in maritime operations and discussed in aviation, while the finance and judicial comparisons remain unmeasured [1][2][3].
Sources used in this answer
Dynamic Bayesian network assessment of collision risk during tandem offloading assisted by dynamic positioning considering fatigue effects on human error and operator response
A dynamic Bayesian network model of maritime tandem offloading found that applying a common fatigue progression to both human error and operator response raised modelled cumulative collision and near-miss probabilities over a 20-hour operation, within that maritime setting only.
Flying in the Face of Criminalization: Navigating Personal and Corporate Liability in Aviation
The paper discusses human error, uncertainty, and liability in aviation, noting that roughly 80% of accidents involve human error and that legal consequences create uncertainty for aviation professionals and the judiciary.
Aircraft accident investigation: human factors & legal challenge: a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Aviation at …
The thesis examines human factors in aircraft accidents, listing mental fatigue among preconditions for unsafe acts and discussing the judiciary's changing role in aviation since the Erebus inquiry.
Criminalization of air disasters: what goal, if any, is being achieved
The paper discusses human error and fatigue in air disasters and notes variation and uncertainty across countries in how such disasters are treated legally.