Pretend play is where make-believe gets practiced
The clearest place to see make-believe in action is children's play. A study of ten families in England and Australia observed young children interacting with Internet-connected toys at home and found that the toys did not shut down make-believe play [4]. Instead, children imitated what the toys did and invented imaginative situations that went beyond the toys' pre-programmed functions [4]. In other words, a toy with a fixed script became a starting point rather than a ceiling.
The researchers describe this using the idea that play blends thinking with social context, and they argue that physical and virtual play should be seen as a continuum rather than as separate worlds [4]. That framing matters for the science of make-believe: it suggests imagination is not a fragile thing that screens or gadgets replace, but a capacity that can absorb new materials. The study is small and observational, so it shows what happened in these ten families rather than proving a general rule [4].
Scientists make believe on purpose when they ask 'what if?'
Make-believe also turns up in a place most people would not expect: scientific reasoning. Scientists often entertain counterfactuals, which are 'what if' statements about situations that did not happen or could not happen, including ones that violate the laws of nature [2]. One philosophical account argues that evaluating these statements works like a game of make-believe: a counterfactual counts as true, in the fiction, when its starting assumption plus the rules of the game tell you to imagine the outcome [2].
This is a proposal about how scientific representation works, not a claim that scientists are playing. The point is that imagination can be rule-governed and disciplined, which is what lets it carry real inferential weight [2]. Under this view, the question of whether a counterfactual is acceptable becomes a question about representation rather than about whether the imagined situation could actually exist [2].
Everyday talk about minds may also run on make-believe
A related debate asks whether our ordinary way of talking about beliefs and desires is itself a kind of make-believe. One interpretation of folk psychology treats everyday mental talk as metaphorical, built on 'prop-oriented make-believe' in which metaphors do essential representational work [5]. On that view, saying someone 'believes' something is not a literal description of an inner mechanism but a useful fiction that still lets us explain behavior.
That view is contested. Critics argue that the metaphors doing the essential work cannot support genuine causal explanation, and that no version of this fictionalist approach preserves the explanatory virtues we normally credit to everyday mental talk [5]. The disagreement is useful for a general reader: it shows that calling something 'make-believe' is not automatically a demotion, but it also is not a free pass. Whether imagination explains behavior or merely redescribes it is still an open argument [5].
Make-believe can be a force in culture, not only in heads
One broader argument extends make-believe from individual minds to public life. It proposes that popular culture and social media can generate alternative storylines to the competitive 'us versus them' narratives that dominate politics and news, and that children in particular are using planetary connectivity to imagine new kinds of worlds [1]. Here make-believe is treated as a cultural and narrative capacity with possible consequences for cooperation and global change.
This is a proposal about alternative narratives rather than a tested psychological mechanism, and it should be read that way [1]. It does, however, connect with the other findings: whether in a child's play, a scientist's model, or a shared story online, make-believe is imagination organized by rules and purposes. The science is clearest about the play and reasoning cases and most speculative about the cultural ones [1][2][4].
Sources used in this answer
Make / Believe
The book argues that popular culture and social media can generate alternative narratives to competitive global storylines, with children and other groups using digital connectivity to imagine new worlds.
Scientific counterfactuals as make-believe
The paper defends a make-believe view in which evaluating scientific counterfactuals is like a rule-governed game of pretense, giving them non-trivial truth-values even when their antecedents are impossible.
2.7 Make-Believe
The text discusses make-believe as driven by desire and as relevant across literature, religion, and science.
Make‐believe play with the Internet of Toys: A case for multimodal playscapes
In observations of ten families, Internet-connected toys did not limit children's make-believe play; children imitated and created imaginative situations beyond the toys' intended functions.
The land of make-believe: metaphor, explanation, and fiction in Toon’s psychological world
The paper critiques Toon's view that folk psychology is prop-oriented make-believe, arguing that representationally essential metaphors cannot support genuine causal explanation.
