Getting Hedging Right: Why Small States Refuse to Choose Sides

Executive Summary

In the high-stakes arena of US-China rivalry, small states are often pressured to "pick a side." However, as Cheng-Chwee Kuik argues in his seminal paper, "Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective," the reality is far more nuanced. Small states are not indecisive; they are hedging.

This paper provides a robust conceptual framework for understanding hedging as a rational, insurance-seeking behavior. By navigating the "twin chessboards" of military security and economic development, states in Southeast Asia and beyond use ambiguity as a shield against the uncertainties of a shifting global order.

The Core Problem: The Great Power Blind Spot

Great powers—specifically the United States and China—suffer from a perceptual gap. They tend to view IR as a zero-sum game of Balancing (countering a threat) or Bandwagoning (siding with a winner).

• The US Mistake: Assuming everyone views China as an imminent military threat that must be contained at all costs.
• The China Mistake: Assuming economic allure (like the Belt and Road Initiative) will naturally lead to political subservience.

Kuik argues that both powers overlook the uncertainty they generate. Whether it’s the US's fluctuating commitment (pivot to Asia vs. America First) or China’s shift from "charm offensive" to maritime assertiveness, it is this lack of strategic certainty that forces small states to hedge.

Methodology: Redefining Hedging

Kuik defines hedging through three distinct attributes that separate it from traditional alignment strategies:

1. Non-Alignment: A persistent refusal to be locked into a rigid, one-sided alliance.
2. Opposite Measures: Pursuing seemingly contradictory acts (e.g., conducting military drills with the US while signing massive trade deals with China).
3. Fallback Positions: Diversifying partnerships so that if one power retreats or becomes aggressive, the state has "exit options."

The "Twin Chessboards" Intuition

The paper introduces a vital distinction between two domains of competition:

• High-Politics: Military security, maritime disputes, and sovereignty.
• Low-Politics: Infrastructure, trade, vaccines, and economic resilience.

While the US dominates the first, China has made significant gains in the second. Small states "play" on both boards simultaneously to maximize their domestic legitimacy and survival.

Case Evidence: Selective Defiance and Deference

Kuik provides a masterclass in analyzing regional behavior through the hedging lens:

• Vietnam: Publicly pushes back against Chinese maritime claims (defiance) while maintaining deep Communist Party-to-Party ties with Beijing (deference).
• Indonesia: Conducts its largest-ever exercises with the US while simultaneously institutionalizing a strategic partnership with China and keeping quiet on sensitive internal Chinese issues.
• Singapore: Hosts US military assets but remains one of China’s largest investors, constantly warning that a forced choice would be disastrous for the "Asian Century."

Critical Analysis: Why Hedging Will Endure

The paper concludes with a provocative insight: Hedging is the second-best option for everyone.

While it frustrates Washington and Beijing, small-state hedging prevents the region from polarizing into a "Cold War-style" confrontation. It maintains a neutral buffer zone that allows for inclusive regionalism (like the RCEP trade agreement).

Limitations and Future Outlook

The "space to hedge" is shrinking. As US-China competition intensifies, the pressure to "clear the ambiguity" grows. Kuik notes that hedging will only stop under two extreme conditions:

1. Pure Balancing: If Beijing becomes an imminent, across-the-board danger to survival.
2. Pure Bandwagoning: If Washington completely retreats from Asia, leaving no alternative support.

Short of these extremes, ambiguity will remain the defining theme of our time.

Conclusion

For anyone trying to predict the future of the Indo-Pacific, Kuik’s work is a reminder: do not mistake a small state’s silence for weakness, or its dual-engagement for opportunism. It is a calculated, survivalist response to a world where neither superpower is a "one-size-fits-all" partner.